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Do we deal in knowledge in 
science lessons?
Seán Moran
As science educators, we assume that a major part of our role involves 
dealing with knowledge, but this is often not the case in school science 
lessons
ABSTRACT
If we accept the standard definition of 
knowledge as ‘true, justified belief’, then much 
of the subject matter of science lessons is not 
knowledge. Our typical classroom treatment of 
the visible spectrum is shown to fail on all three 
of these criteria for knowledge. An alternative 
view is presented in which pupils learn 
narratives from the scientific canon, just as they 
once used to learn stories from ancient Greek 
mythology. In both cases, the myths are useful 
schemata with which to analyse the world.
Knowledge
To begin with, I will spend a little time discussing 
the nature of knowledge – the subject matter of 
epistemology. A traditional definition of knowledge 
is ‘justified, true belief’. This formulation, which 
goes back to Plato (c. 427 BC – c. 347 BC), demands 
that three criteria be satisfied if a proposition is to 
be accorded the status of knowledge. Firstly, the 
proposition must be true. If a purportedly factual 
statement made by us does not correspond with 
reality, then it constitutes not knowledge but false 
belief (or even deliberate deceit). Secondly, we 
must believe the proposition. If we do not, then our 
putative example of knowledge is merely empty 
words; to know something entails that we believe it 
to be the case. Thirdly, we must have a justification 
for holding a true belief. If it simply entered our head 
randomly, the accidental correspondence between 
our thought and the truth cannot be regarded as 
knowledge: it was merely a lucky guess. Each of these 
three criteria is a necessary condition for knowledge, 
and by failing on one or more of them our statement 
has failed the test of being knowledge.
This traditional account of knowledge is not 
without its flaws, as I shall show later, but it is 
nevertheless quite effective at ruling out unqualified 
candidates for the job of being knowledge. Three 
examples illustrate this: (a) a statement made by 
a fortune teller which, by a fluke, turns out to be 
correct [not justified]; (b) geocentric models of the 
universe [not true]; (c) fanciful theories that we are 
living in a computer simulation [not believed]. Any 
proposed knowledge-claim has only to fail on one 
of the three criteria for it to be rejected. However, 
this leads us to the uncomfortable conclusion that 
much of what passes for knowledge in the classroom 
and the examination hall must also be rejected. If we 
science teachers do not deal in true justified belief, 
we do not deal in knowledge.
The visible spectrum
Many of the statements for which we reward pupils 
when they say or write them are neither true, justified 
nor believed by them. For example, we might mark 
as correct the following statement written by a 15-
year-old pupil: ‘The visible spectrum consists of 
seven colours – red, orange, yellow, green, blue, 
indigo and violet.’ A moment’s thought reveals that 
this is not true, however. There is an infinite range 
of wavelengths of light between red and violet, 
and hence an infinite range of colours, not the 
seven claimed by the pupil. One could object to my 
conflating wavelength and colour in this way, but 
even so there are clearly more than seven spectral 
colours. Although there are an infinite number of 
wavelengths between 380 nm and 740 nm, the 
average human visual apparatus can distinguish 
between colours separated by as little as 1 nm in the 
middle of the spectrum and about 10 nm at the two 
ends. Even the worst-case scenario (10 nm colour-
resolution) would thus yield 36 discernibly different 
spectral colours between violet (380 nm) and deep 
red (740 nm). Experienced dyers and colourists 
claim to be able to distinguish – by eye – between 
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about 10 million colours, but this would include the 
various tints (such as the pinks, which combine red 
with white), shades (which have varying proportions 
of black pigment) and non-spectral colours 
(combinations of spectral colours, for example the 
browns). The general point also works with lights as 
well as dyes: pupils will see pink rather than red if 
some ambient white light in an imperfectly blacked-
out lab falls on a patch of red light.
Further investigation reveals just how flimsy is 
the pupil’s justification for her assertion. She did see 
a colourful patch on a sheet of paper when she pointed 
a ray box at a prism in a darkened lab last year, but 
this was not very compelling evidence and certainly 
did not cause her to make her present statement 
about the seven colours. She could not discern the 
difference between indigo and violet, for example, 
and assumed that the teacher’s unwillingness to class 
it all as just shades of purple must have originated 
in his more refined ‘scientific’ awareness of colour. 
(In fact, the physics teacher [me] is colour-blind, as 
attested by his choice of clothes.) The third failure of 
her statement in meeting the criteria of this tripartite 
theory of knowledge involves belief. The pupil does 
not really believe that there are only seven colours. 
The song ‘I can sing a rainbow’ mentions pink and 
she can see no reason why this colour should not be on 
the approved ‘scientific’ list. However, it receives no 
mention in the ‘Richard of York Gave Battle In Vain’ 
mnemonic (Box 1), so for examination purposes she 
decides to suppress her personal beliefs and toe the 
party line. The statement she writes on the exam 
script fails on all three of our criteria, so it cannot be 
regarded as knowledge. Failing to meet even one of 
the criteria is enough to reject a statement from the 
category ‘knowledge’. 
Ivan, a Russian émigré GCSE physics pupil of 
mine, first alerted me to the arbitrary nature of our 
labelling of the spectrum. He identified two colours 
which English-speaking pupils saw as one: Siniy 
(blue) and Goluboy (light blue), so his rainbow has 
an extra colour. A member of the Dani tribe of New 
Guinea, on the other hand, would have identified only 
two colours – mola (bright colour) and mili (dark 
colour) – according to the work of Rosch (1972). 
However, this variation may only reflect linguistic 
convention, rather than perceptual differences. After 
analysing colour terminology across 20 languages 
and 98 cultures, Berlin and Kay (1969) showed that 
there are eleven ‘focal’ colours – white, black, red, 
green, yellow, blue, brown, purple, pink, orange and 
grey – and that these universally recognised colours 
have a biological basis. Some relate to retinal rods 
and the magnocellular (black and white), whilst 
others are associated with opponent process cells 
and the parvocellular (red, yellow, green and blue). 
These focal colours are compared by Berlin and Kay 
to ‘canonical views’, an idea I develop next in a 
slightly different way.
Origin of the speeches
How then, do pupils come to speak and write such 
dubious examples of ‘knowledge’ as the girl produced 
in her traditional ROYGBIV account above, and 
why do we treat them as correct? A somewhat 
provocative answer might be that their behaviour 
as pupils, and ours as teachers, is adaptive in the 
Darwinian sense. Initially, this conjecture seems to 
be counter-intuitive. In early hunter-gatherer society 
(the page in our history during which evolutionary 
psychology suggests that our epistemic virtues 
were written) the holding of false beliefs was not 
conducive to survival. Maladaptive notions about 
the benevolence of sabre-toothed tigers, for instance, 
would tend to shorten the lives of any individuals 
holding them, and would thus be selected against in 
the harsh milieu of that era. In the ecology of the 
school system, however, beliefs are not tested against 
nature ‘red in tooth and claw’ but in the light of the 
approval (or the withholding of approval) of teachers 
BOX 1 Sources of pupil ‘knowledge’
Q. The phrase ‘Richard	of	York	gave	battle	in	vain’ 
is commonly used to help pupils remember the 
seven colours, but where does it come from? 
A. Claimant to the English throne, Richard, Duke 
of York, was defeated at the battle of Wakefield 
in 460 – a key moment in the Wars of the Roses 
– and hence ‘gave	battle	in	vain’. Shakespeare 
tells the story of this battle in Henry	VI	part	III.
Q. Who is responsible for the song ‘I	can	sing	
a	rainbow’ which has led astray generations of 
pupils studying science?
A. Arthur Hamilton wrote ‘I	can	sing	a	rainbow’ 
to be sung by Peggy Lee in the film Pete	Kel-
ly’s	Blues (955). Hamilton also composed the 
classic Julie London song ‘Cry	me	a	river’ (955), 
subsequently recorded by Ella Fitzgerald, Ray 
Charles and Dinah Washington, and so he can be 
forgiven. 
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and examiners. It is a reasonable survival strategy for 
pupils to learn the approved version of the colours of 
the spectrum – together with many other examples of 
received opinion in school science – rather than try 
too hard to develop an alternative analysis of their 
observations. We reward this compliance fulsomely, 
and those pupils who are astute enough to realise 
this thrive and succeed in the school environment, 
by adopting canonical views for examination 
purposes. This is not a genuine adoption however. 
Pupils often only engage with these orthodoxies to 
the extent of using them in school contexts: they 
do not embrace them and take them fully into their 
existing families of schemata. Stefan Ramaekers 
(2001), echoing Nietzsche, rather harshly labels our 
part in this as ‘Teaching to Lie and Obey’. Instead of 
being the honest brokers of scientific knowledge we 
thought we were, we are simply initiating our pupils 
into a cultural heritage, in which a familiarity with 
ROYGBIV is on a par with knowing the words to the 
nursery rhyme ‘Ring-a-ring of roses’. Neither has 
any claim to involve truth, but both are embedded in 
17th-century history: Newton’s experimental work 
and the plague respectively. (The children’s rhyme 
begins with the first symptoms of the plague – the 
‘ring of roses’ on the skin – and ends with the death 
of the victim: ‘They all fall down’.)
Feyerabend (1987) puts this historical 
dependency of science well:
The formulae that adorn our textbooks are 
temporarily frozen parts of activities that move 
with the stream of history.
Our self-view as honest brokers of scientific 
knowledge is under threat if we accept the 
argument so far. One possible riposte is to attack 
the tripartite theory of knowledge upon which 
the argument depends, and the work of Edmund 
Gettier (1963) has spawned an entire philosophical 
industry in attempting to do just that. Gettier does 
not help us in our present quandary, though, for his 
examples exclude even more claimants to the title 
of knowledge: propositions which pass the test of 
being ‘true, justified belief’ but can be shown not to 
be knowledge. We want to proceed in the opposite 
direction and find ways of shoe-horning the things we 
teach back into a working definition of knowledge. 
If we can’t do this, we must simply admit that much 
of our subject matter has no legitimate claim to being 
knowledge.
Redefining ‘knowledge’
We can perhaps begin this process by re-
conceptualising ‘true’, ‘justified’ and ‘belief’. 
Beginning with ‘true’, we can set out to find an 
alternative to a straightforward ‘correspondence’ 
view of truth – that is, the commonsense view that 
the statement ‘The snow is white’ is true if it really 
is the case that the snow is white. This may even 
be a desirable re-conceptualisation. We have no 
direct access to reality itself (Kant’s noumena) but 
only to our own perceptions and conceptualisations 
of reality (phænomena), so we cannot check for 
correspondence between (a) our view of things as 
they seem to be, and (b) things as they actually are, 
irrespective of our view. When we say ‘The snow is 
white’ we are making a statement about appearance 
– about our perceptions and conceptualisations 
– because that is all we have to go on. To make a 
truth-claim about our statement would require us 
to access directly things as they really are and to 
compare this actuality with our statement about 
appearance. However, if we had the gift of direct 
access to things ‘as they actually are’, we would not 
need to compare them with things ‘as they seem to 
be’, so the notion of correspondence is redundant. 
Since we are not blessed with omniscience, we try 
in vain to establish a correspondence between two 
realms, only one of which we can enter: the realm of 
things as they appear to be.
A possible replacement for the correspondence 
model is the ‘coherence’ view of truth. By this, we 
mean that statements are taken to be true if they fit 
coherently into our pre-existing network of beliefs. 
This is not a fixed web, though: we are usually 
willing to modify some of the beliefs in our network, 
in the light of recalcitrant empirical evidence. For 
example, pupils will eventually give up their notion 
that plants draw ‘food’ from the soil if they have 
enough experience to the contrary – perhaps including 
the growing of mustard and cress on damp blotting 
paper. Others concepts are much more difficult to 
shift though, securely enmeshed as they are at the 
centre of our personal webs of belief. Having said 
this, even our cherished belief in non-contradiction 
(that something cannot both be and not be at the same 
time) is under attack from uncomfortable results in 
quantum physics.
The need for justification can similarly be 
modified. Rather than insist on an empirical 
determination of all claims to knowledge (which 
is both unworkable in practice and not needed if 
we accept the web-of-belief model underlying 
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the coherence theory of truth), we could claim to 
be entitled to accept normally reliable sources of 
knowledge at face value. It is impracticable always 
to put all putative ‘facts’ to the empirical test, and 
we hope that our pupils are willing to concede that, 
fallible as we are, most of the statements we make as 
teachers can be trusted.
The final modification is to the ‘belief’ 
requirement of the tripartite definition. The so-called 
‘diffident schoolboy’ objection is that a pupil may 
not have a secure knowledge of (say) the chemical 
symbol for lead, but may still write down ‘Pb’ 
in response to an examination question, without 
being sure whether or not this is the correct answer. 
During the exam post-mortem with his friends, they 
remind him of the slightly risqué way in which their 
chemistry teacher helped the class to remember this 
particular symbol, and he now has a firmer claim 
to this knowledge. The significant point here is 
that at the time he was required to demonstrate his 
knowledge the diffident schoolboy hadn’t been so 
sure, and he had written the correct answer down 
with little confidence. During the exam, he didn’t 
really believe in his answer, so he was arguably 
not in full possession of this bit of knowledge. To 
sidestep this famous objection, we can simply apply 
an operational definition to school knowledge: 
‘School knowledge is that which is demonstrated 
in exams’. The feelings of the pupil do not come 
into this definition, so a person scoring well in a 
chemistry exam is deemed to have good chemistry 
knowledge, irrespective of the degree of confidence 
with which the questions were answered.
We have dissolved the original problem by 
re-framing our view of what constitutes school 
scientific knowledge, but it leaves me feeling a little 
uncomfortable. Does it you? On this new construal, 
truth is what fits comfortably into our conceptual 
schemata, justification can come from accepting the 
word of an expert and pupils need not believe what 
they write down in exams.
Beyond the spectrum
I have spent quite an amount of time showing that 
the traditional school science narrative about the 
colours of the visible spectrum fails the tripartite 
criterion for knowledge. It may be argued that we 
need only stop re-telling this particular myth and we 
can once again claim to be dealing in knowledge, 
since the rest of the stories we tell in school science 
are perfectly reasonable. Unfortunately this is not 
the case, and a few minutes’ thought reveals the 
unwelcome presence of spurious ‘knowledge’ 
throughout school science. In chemistry lessons, for 
example, I, along with many other members of our 
profession, have told pupils that ‘everything is made 
of atoms’. This is an extremely suspect ontology, 
excluding as it does fields and electromagnetic 
waves and – less obviously – thoughts and numbers. 
In physics, the solar-system view of atoms we teach 
to younger pupils is not literally true (although it has 
some justification in terms of its explanatory power) 
and is rightly not believed by many pupils, except as 
a way of earning credit in exams. In biology, more 
controversially, evolutionary theory is not believed 
by large numbers of pupils in the United States (and 
a sizeable minority of children here in Northern 
Ireland). Similarly, in geological discussions about 
the evidence for the age of the Earth from radioactive 
decay data, some fundamentalist Christian pupils 
will insist that Archbishop Usher was correct in 
dating the Earth’s creation as 4004 BC and that the 
scientific evidence is flawed, or has been put there 
by the Devil to test our faith.
How are we as teachers to deal with the problem 
of these, and other, instances of the concepts with 
which we daily do business, being either untrue, 
unjustified or disbelieved by our pupils?
This is not a simple question, but it is one that 
we should address as teachers. One possible solution 
to our problem is to adopt a post-modernist stance 
towards knowledge. There are many stories out 
there that purport to be ‘truths’, but there is no grand 
narrative that can justifiably assert a claim to being 
‘The truth’. School science is just one narrative 
amongst many. Paul Churchland’s (1988) point that 
‘the warmth of the Summer air does not feel like the 
mean kinetic energy of millions of tiny molecules but 
that is what it is’ is a misleading contrast between 
two descriptions of reality, of which the scientific 
version is deemed to be the correct one. There is 
no incoherence in accepting both descriptions as 
correct, or indeed embracing a third model involving 
probability-waves rather than particles. We ought to 
be honest about this and let pupils see that although 
science has made some spectacular advances over 
the past few centuries, it is not the only story to be 
told. All pupils – of whatever religious persuasion – 
should know the key components of secular western 
science, as parts of an important narrative that has 
useful explanatory power. We are the storytellers who 
can bring these fables alive and stage-manage our 
pupils as they play their roles, engage with the props 
and improvise around the script. We need to make it 
clear that school science is a cultural phenomenon 
with many oversimplifications and is merely a 
staging-post on a journey to a fuller understanding 
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of the beliefs of the scientific community. These 
beliefs, in turn, are not infallible and are frequently 
changing in the light of new evidence and theoretical 
frameworks. Paradigm-shifts occur every so often 
that require the textbooks to be re-written.
Usefulness of our fables
There is no harm – indeed there might be some 
value – in learning that the colours of the spectrum 
in decreasing order of wavelength are red orange 
yellow green blue indigo and violet. It may not, 
strictly speaking, be knowledge, but it is a tried and 
tested little anecdote in the set of tales that comprise 
school science: a snippet of learning that is easy 
to investigate in the lab, easy to learn, easy to test, 
and easy to expand into a fuller account of wave 
theory as the pupils become more scientifically 
sophisticated. In times gone by, a classical education 
was valued greatly in the West, so Greek myths were 
the predominant stories amongst the educated. They 
could be used as tools for thinking, and their truth 
or otherwise was largely unimportant. For example, 
Homer’s myth of Mentor is relevant in education 
even today:
Mentor was an old friend of Odysseus, to whom 
the king had entrusted his whole household 
when he sailed, with orders to defer to the aged 
Laertes and keep everything safe and sound. 
We apply this idea of a trusted friend who provides 
wise counsel for a less experienced protégé (Odysseus’ 
young son Telemachus) to the widespread present-
day practice of having qualified teachers supervise 
student-teachers on school placement. The classical 
notion forms a narrative ‘peg’ upon which we can 
hang our contemporary stories, and in recognition 
of this we call the experienced teacher ‘the mentor’. 
We can then unpack Homer’s story a little more and 
consider the extent to which Mentor (the goddess 
Athene disguised in human form) allowed his 
protégé Telemachus to make his own mistakes and 
hence learn from them: an important judgement to 
be made when we guide student-teachers.
The myth of the spectrum can similarly be 
unwrapped. Pupils begin by seeing an undifferentiated 
whole: the rainbow. Next, they discriminate between 
the colours and split the spectrum into seven bands 
– a convenient chunk of information to assimilate. 
Later, they come to appreciate the idea of a continuum 
of wavelengths of which any subdivision is arbitrary. 
This snippet becomes a tool for thinking, and the 
idea of a spectrum is one that can be applied outside 
its laboratory context. For example, we now talk 
of some pupils as ‘being on the autistic spectrum’, 
rather than as ‘being autistic’. We recognise that this 
disorder can vary in extent and we initially identify 
four levels (similar to our splitting the spectrum into 
seven colours): (a) high functioning/Asperger’s (b) 
mild (c) moderate (d) severe. The next stage in the 
degree of conceptual sophistication is the recognition 
that, like the visible spectrum, the autistic spectrum 
encompasses an infinite range of severities. Every 
child is a unique case. Knowing the myth of the 
visible spectrum has helped us to refine our thinking 
about the autistic spectrum: from an undifferentiated 
whole to a series of infinitesimal increments.
So, to return to the question originally asked, 
do we deal in knowledge in science lessons? The 
answer can be ‘yes we do’, as long as we adopt a 
broad view of ‘knowledge’ and recognise that our 
scientific stories take their place alongside other 
myths, including the tales told by teachers of other 
subjects and the narratives of popular culture.
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